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We study which policy tool and at what level would be chosen by majority voting to reduce negative
externalities, such as pollution. We consider three instruments: a rule, that sets an upper limit to the
polluting activity, a quota that obliges to proportional reduction, and a tax on the activity. For all instruments
the majority chooses too restrictive levels when pollution is mainly due to a small fraction of the population,
and when costs for reducing activities or paying taxes are convex, and viceversa. Even though a tax
is in general superior to the other two instruments, the majority may strategically choose a rule in order














There are three ways usually discussed to reduce the amount of an activity
generating negative externalities: a rule which sets an upper bound to this
activity, a compulsory proportional reduction for everybody of the activity or
a tax on it. Much of the analysis of the choice and the level of the instrument
is normative, namely what would be the optimal policy tool to maximize
social welfare. Generally speaking taxes are superior to quantitative limits
because they allow individuals to optimize over the cost of paying the tax
or reducing the activity and also because taxes generate revenues.
In this paper we adopt instead a “positive”, approach by investigating
which policy and at what level would be chosen by majority voting. The lat-
ter does not deliver the optimal policy for two reasons. First for given choice
of policy instruments, majority voting does not deliver the optimal level of
the instrument. Second, and perhaps more interestingly, when choosing
amongst alternative instruments majority voting in general does not lead to
the choice of the superior one (say taxes rather than rules). For instance,
a majority may choose a rule instead of a proportional tax only because a
rule concentrates on the minority the burden of the externality reduction.
This may explain why sub optimal policy instruments often survive for a
long time.
We can relate the nature of the departure from optimality to various
features of the distributions of costs and beneﬁts amongst individuals. One
of our results is that all instruments tend to be too restrictive (i.e. not allow
enough negative externalities) when those who generate them (which in short
we sometime label “polluters”) are a relatively small minority and the cost
that they incur for reducing externalities grows at a fast rate. In particular,
a rule is highly ineﬃcient when the minority bears large costs compared to
the beneﬁts received by the majority. In fact, a rule is a “cheap” instrument
in the hands of the majority for aﬀecting minority’s behavior, a sort of
tyranny of the majority. Thus we should observe highly restrictive rules for
activities concentrated in some speciﬁc sectors or for very large “polluters”,
while rules might be too lax for activities that a majority enjoys, say car
pollution.1
We should make clear from the outset that we consider only proportional
taxes on the polluting activities. By allowing any type of curvature on
the tax schedule, including corners, one could reproduce patterns which
approximate, say a rule, and are quite far from the allocation generated by
a proportional tax. While this would not be a problem for a social planner,
from the point of view of a “positive” politico economic model we need to
worry about the existence of a Condorcet winner. While we can prove its
1A counter argument not considered in this paper is that speciﬁc and highly concen-
trated sectors might have a stronger lobbying capacity.
2existence with a proportional tax, in general one cannot do that with any
curvature of the tax schedule. Thus all of our positive results would be
interpreted as comparing rules and quotas versus a proportional tax on
the polluting activities. Realistically speaking these are the kind of policies
routinely discussed in this area. Therefore from now on when we refer to a
“tax” we mean a proportional tax on the polluting activity. We brieﬂyr e t u r n
to this issue in the conclusions. On the spending side we examine both the
case in which revenues are used to produce a public good (in the main body
of the paper) and the case in which the revenues are redistributed lump sum
(in Appendix). The results are qualitatively the same.2 Also when thinking
speciﬁcally of “pollution” there are important issues of intergenerational
redistributions of costs and beneﬁts of the externality and of the policies
adopted to reduce it. We do not investigate these issues in this paper, so,
strictly speaking, we should think of negative externalities which aﬀect only
the currently alive, say “noise”.
We frame our model in the tradition of the political economy literature on
ﬁscal policies;3 but we focus upon rules and externalities rather than redis-
tributive taxation. The small literature which introduces political economy
considerations in this area is conﬁned to environmental issues.4 We share
with this literature the idea that majorities may prefer regulation to taxes,
even when the latter would be socially optimal, whenever regulation and
taxes are available policy options. Buchanan and Tullock (1975) compare
environmental taxes with a proportional reduction of polluting activities,
that they call “regulation”. There is no voting stage or any speciﬁcation of
the political process in their work. They oﬀer several arguments in favor
of taxes, but they claim that people are more likely to prefer proportional
reduction. Congleton (1992) focuses on how political institutions aﬀect the
enactment of environmental regulations. Individuals belong to two classes:
a high income elite, and the rest of the population. They have to choose the
amount of a costly environmental standard. Since the standard reduces ag-
gregate income, the elite wants lower control. Thus an authoritarian regime
is less inclined to stringent standards than a democratic system. Boyer and
Laﬀont (1999) look at the optimal level of ﬂexibility that should be dele-
gated to the majority. Diﬀerent majorities have diﬀerent stakes in the rents
of a polluting monopolist, and there is asymmetry in information. Fluc-
2Some speciﬁcd i ﬀerences between the conditions which determine the extent of the
ineﬃciency are described in the Appendix.
3Since the seminal works of Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981), this
literature has extensively studied the conﬂict between majority and minority and how
alternative institutional arrangements aﬀect the eﬃciency of the government, its size, and
the allocation of public spending. See Persson and Tabellini (2000). Note that in Meltzer
and Richard’s framework results only apply to linear tax schedules for the same reason
discussed above in the context of the present paper.
4For a survey on arguments in favor or against environmental taxes and quantitative
regulations, with some reference to political economy issues, see Hepburn (2006).
3tuating majorities determine excessive ﬂuctuation in environmental policy.
Thus constitutional constraints may be desirable. Cremer, De Donder and
Gahvari (2004) study the eﬃciency of majority voting on an environmental
tax. The proceeds are used to refund income and capital taxes. If labor
and capital taxes are rebated in the same proportion, the environmental
tax chosen by the majority is too low. Eﬃciency increases by refunding a
higher proportion of labor incomes. In a related work (Cremer, De Donder
and Gahvari, 2008), they consider the role of militants and opportunists
within political parties. When militants are powerful the outcome is a large
environmental tax.
The present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the
basic model of the activity which produces negative externalities. In Section
3 we study the majority vote equilibrium when the policy instrument is a
compulsory rule. In Section 4 we consider quotas, and in Section 5 taxation
of the activity with the negative externality with public good provision. In
Section 6 we study the choice of the policy instrument by majority rule.
Section 7 concludes and illustrates several extensions of the model. All
the proofs are in Appendix 8.1. Appendix 8.2 presents the model with
proportional tax and uniform refunds of the proceeds.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider a society with a continuum of individuals/voters of size one; each
individual has an exogenously given location in the interval [0,1].C a l lt h o s e
locations “types”: ti for individual i. ti represents the behavior that i can
assume at no costs. Instead behaving diﬀerently from ti entails for i an
“adjustment cost”, which depends on the distance between type ti and his
behavior denoted by bi. Types and behaviors are constrained in the unit
interval: ti,b i ∈ [0,1].W e c a n t h i n k o f ti as the level of the activity that
maximizes proﬁts (in case of a ﬁrm) or utility (in case of a consumer). For
instance, the proﬁt maximizing level of polluting emission for a ﬁrm, the
ideal speed adopted on a highway by a driver, the ideal alcohol consumption,
the eﬀortless production of waste. A deviation from such optimal level
entails a cost.
The adjustment cost function, c, is the same for all individuals:
c(|bi − ti|) (1)
with c(0) = 0 and c0(0) = 0; c(.) > 0, c0(.) > 0, c00(.) > 0, for any bi 6= ti.
The externality produced by an individual with behavior bi is ε(bi) with
ε0(bi) < 0 and ε00(bi) < 0. The negative externality produced by an individ-
ual increases at the margin with his behavior. These assumptions on the
externality function, together with those regarding costs, simplify the analy-
sis and reduce the number of “special cases” in this non-parametric model.
4More on this below. If we denote with G(b) the cumulative distribution of




A given behavior by someone generates the same externality as an equal
behavior by anyone else, and the externality produced by an individual is
not aﬀected by the behavior of the others. For any behavioral proﬁle G(b)
everyone receives the same externality. Changing behavior comes at the
same cost for everyone, and it does not aﬀect the externality produced by
anyone else. The utility of individual i, Ui, is given by the diﬀerence between




ε(b)dG(b) − c(|bi − ti|) (3)
Each individual is inﬁnitely small. The externality change that he per-
ceives from modifying his own behavior is inﬁnitesimal. As a consequence,
he is never willing to adopt a behavior that is diﬀerent from his type, in-
dependently of the behavior of any other individual. Then if F(t) is the
cumulative distribution of types, free riding implies that F(t) is also the





There is scope for government intervention.
3 Voting on a rule
Consider the case of a rule, ρ,w h i c hﬁxes an upper bound to the behavior
of all individuals. The timing is as follows: ﬁrst, individuals compute their
policy preferences regarding ρ; then they vote, selecting ˆ ρ in pair-wise voting;
ﬁnally, they choose their behavior. The rule, ˆ ρ, is fully enforced. All types
higher than the rule have to adjusts and pay the costs; all types below ˆ ρ
continue to behave just as their types. Any individual knows that, by voting
for a rule ρ,h ec a na ﬀect the behavior of 1 − F(ρ) individuals whose types
are above ρ, and can enjoy from the reduction of their negative externalities.
However, if ρ is lower than his type, he has to bear a private adjustment
costs. The individual preference function can be then written as
Ui(ρ)=ε(ρ) · (1 − F(ρ)) +
Z ρ
0
ε(t) · f(t)dt − c(|ρ − ti|) (4)
where f(t)=F0(t).T h e ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of (4) is the
externality received by i that is produced by all the aﬀected individuals (i.e.
5those with ti >ρ ); the second term is the externality received by i that
is produced by the non-aﬀected individuals below ρ; the third term is i’s
private compliance cost. If we assume that marginal gains from setting a
lower rule are decreasing, then Ui(ρ) is concave. In this case, i has a uniquely
preferred rule. Formally, concavity is ensured when the following inequality
is satisﬁed for any ρ:
ε00(ρ) · (1 − F(ρ)) − ε0(ρ) · f(ρ) <c 00(|ρ − ti|) (5)
Note that convexity of costs and concavity of ε are not suﬃcient to satisfying
(5). In fact, F needs to be “smooth” overall.5 Under this condition, which
we assume from now on, a Condorcet winner exists (Black, 1948).
When evaluating a rule an individual trades oﬀ his private compliance
sacriﬁce against the reduction in externality due to aﬀecting other people.
Call ρ∗
i the most preferred rule, or i’s bliss point. If ρ∗
i ∈ (0,t i),t h eF O C
for maximizing Ui(ρ) is satisﬁed:
(1 − F(ρ)) · ε0(ρ)=c0(|ρ − ti|) (6)
Equation (6) shows that the most preferred rule is set where the marginal
private beneﬁt due to aﬀecting 1 − F(ρ) individuals equals the marginal
private cost due to complying with the rule.6 Nobody would prefer a rule
higher than his type; in fact that rule would be dominated by a rule equal
to the individual’s type, since he would reduce negative externalities and
not suﬀer an adjustment cost. Due to our assumption that marginal cost
in ti is zero, an individual prefers a rule that is lower than his type; thus
ρ∗
i ∈ [0,t i).7
The following Lemma states that lower types prefer lower rules.
Lemma 1 For any two players i and j,i fti >t j,t h e nρ∗
i ≥ ρ∗
j
Call ts t h em e d i a nt y p ea n dl e tρ∗
s be his bliss point. Under majority
rule, the voting outcome, ˆ ρs, is the bliss point of the median type:
ˆ ρs = ρ∗
s
The socially optimal rule ˆ ρ∗ in general diﬀers from the voting outcome, ˆ ρs.
In fact ˆ ρ∗ maximizes a “social” policy preference schedule, call it W(ρ),t h a t
5By “smoothness” we mean that the density of types must never be too high, otherwise,
for some ρ, the marginal gains from reducing the rule might not be decreasing due to high
density of new individuals aﬀected.
6The reader should remind that both sides of (6) are negative. In particular, since
ρ<t i, the right-hand one is negative due to the presence of the absolute value operator
in the argument of c.
7Of course, corner bliss points, with ρ
∗
i =0 ,w i l lc o n c e r nq u i t el o wt y p e s .
6is the sum of all players’ utilities subject to the fact that, once ρ has passed,
all types above ρ lower their behaviors down to ρ:







If ˆ ρ∗ ∈ (0,1), then it solves the following FOC:
(1 − F(ρ)) · ε0(ρ)=ac0(ρ) (7)
where ac0(ρ)=
R 1
ρ c0(|ρ − t|)f(t)dt represents the average marginal cost over
the entire population.8 Note how diﬀerent the calculus of the social plan-
ner is from the calculus of the median voter. Both consider the per-capita
marginal externality received from 1 − F(ρ) aﬀected people. The former,
however, is interested in the cost borne in average by any single individual
in the society. The latter pays attention only to his own private marginal
cost. Suppose that c0(|ρ − ts|) is, in absolute value, low compared to ac0(ρ).
In this case, the median voter has an incentive to ﬁx a low rule. Since costs
are convex, this case is more likely when the median voter is a low type,
compared to the other aﬀected people.
Say that, if ˆ ρs < ˆ ρ∗, the rule is too restrictive;i fˆ ρs > ˆ ρ∗,t h er u l ei stoo
permissive. In the case both ˆ ρs and ˆ ρ∗ are internal, we have that:
Proposition 1 i) Simple majority voting yields a too restrictive (too per-
missive) rule if and only if in equilibrium the ratio between the median voter’s
marginal cost and the average marginal cost of the aﬀected population is
lower (higher) than the share of the aﬀected population.
ii) Majority voting yields the socially optimal rule if and only if the ratio
between those marginal costs equals the share of the aﬀected population.
What makes an equilibrium rule too restrictive relative to the optimal
rule? One factor is the nature of compliance costs: when cost convexity
is high, the median voters’ marginal cost may be substantially lower than
t h ea v e r a g e . I nt h i sc a s ec o m p l i a n c eb yh i g ht y p e sc a nb es o c i a l l yv e r y
costly but the median voter does not care about it. In other words the
median voter disregards “too much” relative to the social planner the high
costs of high types. Another incentive to set a restrictive rule arises from
the distribution of types. If the median voter has a concentration of types
close but below his position lowering the rule is highly productive for him
since he can aﬀect the behavior of additional individuals with a relatively
limited private adjustment cost. Broadly speaking, this situation is likely to
occur when F(t) is rather skewed towards high types, in the sense that the
8Notice that the average marginal cost of the aﬀected population is ac
0(ρ)/(1 − F(ρ)).
This is the average considered in Proposition 1 below.
7median type is substantially lower than the average type.9 This tendency to
disregard costs borne by others is more evident when externalities are low
compared to adjustment costs. In this case the median chooses a rule that
is very close to his type, forcing other people to substantial changes in their
behavior. The beneﬁts that the median enjoys are low, but his cost is low
as well.
In summary a too restrictive rule is likely to come about when polluting
activities are concentrated in a minority of high types. This implies that in
a political equilibrium society is likely to allow “not enough” polluting activ-
ities when the latter are concentrated in some speciﬁc sectors or producers,
and too much pollution for activities enjoyed by many like driving.
4V o t i n g o n a q u o t a
We now analyze a policy which requires a reduction of the activity by a
proportion τ ∈ [0,1] which we call “quota”. Once τ h a sb e e nd e c i d e db yt h e
majority, any individual i has to lower his behavior from ti to bi =( 1−τ)ti.




ε((1 − τ)t)dF(t) − c(τti) (8)
The concavity of policy preferences is ensured by the concavity of ε and
the convexity of c.10 Each voter i has a preferred quota, call it τ∗
i,w h i c h ,




0 tε0((1−τ)t)·f(t)dt is the (positive per capita) marginal
externality produced, after the quota has been enforced. The most preferred
quota equalizes private marginal compliance costs to the private marginal
beneﬁts due to behavior reductions by all individuals.
Lemma 2 shows how the most preferred quotas are related to types.
Lemma 2 For any two individuals i and j,i fti >t j then τ∗
i ≤ τ∗
j.
9Consider, however, that a rightward skewed F(t) with a median lower than the average
is only a favorable, but not a suﬃcient condition for a too restrictive rule emerging. Note
the analogy with the Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) taxation model of in which the key
factor determining the tax level is the distance between the median income and its average.









In words, consider that a quota forces diﬀerent types to assume diﬀerent behaviors. There-
fore, the concavity of total private externalities must be evaluated as the average of the
second derivative (left-hand side of the inequality above). Of course, since ε
00 is negative
in any point and c
00 is always positive, inequality above is always satisﬁed.
8Therefore, the types who produce larger negative externalities prefer
lower quotas. The reason is that, for any quota, they get the same externality
as any lower type, but, since they have to adjust more, they bear higher
adjustment costs.11
Under majority rule, the pivot is the median type, and the voting out-
come is his most preferred quota:
ˆ τs = τ∗
s
Let us take the social perspective. We will say that a quota is too
restrictive when it is higher than the socially optimal one, and vice versa for








Due to the concavity of the Ui(τ)’s, also W(τ) is concave. The optimal
quota, ˆ τ∗, maximizes W(τ).I fˆ τ∗ ∈ (0,1),i th a st os a t i s f yt h eF O C :
aε0(τ)=ac0(τ) (10)
where, aε0(τ) is the average marginal externality, and ac0(τ)=
R 1
0 tc0(τt) ·
f(t)dt is the average cost due to a marginal increase in the quota. One could
call them the social per-capita marginal beneﬁts and costs of a quota.
The left-hand sides in (9) and (10) are the same. This means that the
median voter and the social planner perceive marginal beneﬁts from a quota
in the same way. Hence, any diﬀerences in their choices resides in how they
perceive marginal costs. Speciﬁcally, the median voter has an incentive to
prefer higher quotas when his marginal costs are lower than the average.
This is the point made in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Simple majority voting yields a too restrictive (too permis-
sive) quota if and only if in equilibrium the median voter’s marginal cost is
lower (higher) than the average marginal cost.
The policy outcome is too restrictive when the median bears low mar-
ginal costs, compared to the average. This is more likely to occur when cost
convexity is high or type distribution is slanted towards high types. The
intuition is that, since a quota forces to adjustments that are proportional
to types, a low median makes small adjustments. His marginal costs are
relatively low, compared to the average. Then he is inclined to prefer a
too high quota. Moreover, highly convex costs “push” the average upwards;
therefore, the median’s costs remain relatively low at the margin. Consider,
11There might be corner bliss points, τ
∗
i =1 , which are likely to concern low types,
large externalities and low marginal costs.
9however, that a rightward skewed F(t) with a median lower than the aver-
age is only a favorable, but not suﬃcient, condition for a too restrictive rule
emerging.12
In summary, in many cases both a rule and a quota can be too restrictive.
But are there cases in which a majority that selects a too permissive quota
would alternatively choose a too restrictive rule? The answer is “yes”.13
Interestingly, however, the vice versa is impossible.
Proposition 3 When the majority selects a rule that is too permissive, then
it selects a quota that is also too permissive. The vice versa is not true.
To explain the intuition behind this result, recall that an instrument is
too permissive when the median’s marginal cost is higher than the average.
Recall also that a rule concentrates costs on high types, whose marginal
costs “push” the average upwards. Suppose the rule is too permissive. This
means that the median’s position is so high or cost convexity is so low that,
despite cost concentration, the average marginal cost is lower than the me-
dian’s marginal cost. By contrast, the quota shares costs more equally across
population. This lowers the average which remains below the median’s mar-
ginal cost. Thus the quota cannot be too restrictive. In synthesis, when
the policy is a rule instead of a quota the risk of a too restrictive outcome
is higher. In a sense, the risk of the tyranny of a majority of low types is
always higher if a rule is adopted.
5V o t i n g o n a t a x
We now examine a proportional tax (tax for brevity) μ (μ ≥ 0) so that the
tax burden for individual i is μbi. The government uses the tax revenue
to provide a non excludable public good, g. In Appendix 8.2 we consider
the case in which tax proceeds are redistributed lump sum to population.14
Call γ(g) the individual utility from an amount g of public good. Let γ be
increasing, concave and the same for all i.C a l ld(μbi) the cost that i bears
from paying the tax when his behavior is bi,w i t hd0(.) > 0 and d00(.) > 0.
Given a behavior proﬁle G(b),a na m o u n tg of the public good, and a tax μ,
individual utility is:
12Suppose that average and median types coincide. A special case in which majority
rule delivers the socially optimal quota is when marginal costs are linear. This special
situation parallels Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) model.
13Take for example linear marginal costs and a type distribution in which the median is







s) > 1). Thus the quota is too permissive. In the case of a
rule, it may easily be that the median selcts a level such that his marginal cost is lower
than the average cost of the aﬀected people (i.e., c
0(|ρ
∗






the rule is too restrictive.
14The results are qualitatively similar. Some diﬀerences in the conditions leading to




ε(b)dG(b)+γ(g) − c(|bi − ti|) − d(μbi)
Without a tax, non-atomic individuals do not contribute to the public good,
unilaterally. The timing is, as always, that individuals compute ﬁrst their
preferences on μ; then they vote in pair-wise voting; then they choose their
behavior, and pay taxes accordingly. The government provides the public




μ · b(t,μ)dF(t)=μ ·¯ b
where ¯ b = ¯ b(μ) is the “after-tax” average behavior in the society.
The relationship between behavior and tax derives from the individual
cost optimization for given tax. The solution of that problem is given by
the FOC:15
−c0(|b − ti|)=μ · d0(μb) (11)
If the tax increases, individuals reduce their behavior and for any tax, higher
types will prefer higher behaviors. Thus, from the FOC we can derive in






Because of taxes individuals lower their behaviors below their types. Let
this eﬀect be the “ﬁrst dividend”. The “second dividend” of taxation is the
ﬁnancing of the public good. Note that the second dividend does not simply
add on to the ﬁrst one. Paying taxes and adjusting behavior are substitutes:
people pay taxes in order to avoid to adjust to zero. As a consequence, the
public good provision substitutes further externality reductions. Note the
diﬀerence with the usual Laﬀer curve. In that case a policy maker would
never set an income tax beyond the level that maximizes revenues. In our
model it could be optimal to do so because of the double dividend: beyond
the maximum, at least for small increases, the loss of tax revenues can be
oﬀset by the gain due to the reduction in externality.




ε(b(t,μ))dF(t)+γ(μ¯ b(μ)) − ω(.,ti) (13)
with ω(.,ti)=c(|b(ti,μ) − ti|)+d(μb(ti,μ)).T h e ﬁrst term in the right-
hand side of (13) represents the externality from the after-tax behaviors of
15Recall that c
0(|b − ti|) is negative, thus −c
0(|b − ti|) is positive.
16Function b is not indexed since, because of the symmetry assumptions on c and d,
diﬀerences in the behaviors of the individuals result only from diﬀerences in their types.
The convexity of both c and d takes care of the SOC.
11all individuals; the second one is the beneﬁt from the public good; the third
term, ω(.,ti), is the adjustment cost from modifying behavior plus the cost
of paying taxes. Due to the concavity of ε and γ, and the convexity of c and
d, Ui(μ) is concave. Thus, the bliss point μ∗
i is unique and, if diﬀerent from













¡¯ b + μ¯ b0
μ
¢
are the private marginal
beneﬁts from externality reduction and from the public good, respectively.








.S i n c ec and d are convex,
then ω0
μ (.,ti) is increasing in ti.L e m m a3b e l o wi sat o o lt os o l v et h ev o t i n g
stage.
Lemma 3 For any two individuals i and j,i fti >t j then μ∗
i ≤ μ∗
j.
Under the simple majority, the median type is the pivot, and the voting
outcome is his most preferred tax: ˆ μs = μ∗
s.
Let us consider the eﬃciency of the voting outcome. The policy bench-








Concavity of the individual preferences ensures that also W(μ) is concave;





















the same as above. The social planner would choose a tax such that per-
capita marginal beneﬁts are equal to per-capita (or average) marginal costs.
Observe that the per-capita social marginal beneﬁt is the same as the private
beneﬁt of any individual voter. This means that any diﬀerence between the
median voter’s and the social planner’s preferences about the externality tax
is due to diﬀerences in the marginal costs.
Proposition 4 Simple majority voting yields a too restrictive (too permis-
sive) externality tax if and only if the median voter’s marginal cost is lower
than the average marginal cost.17
Proposition 4 suggests that the eﬃciency of the voting outcome is related
to the relative size of the median voter’s marginal costs, like rules and quotas.
17The proof parallels the proof of Proposition 2 above. Thus we omit it.
12Cost convexity and a relatively low position of the median tend to determine
a too restrictive outcome.
We have seen above that a rule is more likely to be too restrictive with
respect to a quota. What can we say about a tax? If the sacriﬁce of paying
t a x e si ss i m i l a r( o re v e ne q u a l )t ot h es a c r i ﬁce of changing behavior (i.e.
d(.)=c(.)) then individuals minimize costs by reducing their behaviors pro-
portionally to their types. This is illustrated in the upper graph of Figure
1, where the marginal cost of adjusting behavior, c0(.), and of paying taxes,
μd0(.), are symmetric and linear. Two individuals, a high type h,a n dal o w
type l, are represented. In this case, the impact of an externality tax is sim-
ilar to a quota: both types reduce their behaviors proportionally, then they
pay proportional taxes on the after-tax behaviors. The allocation of costs
across population comes out of proportional adjustments, a mechanism that
is similar to the quota. As a consequence also the ratio between median’s
marginal cost and average marginal cost behaves in the same way as for the
quota. This means that a quota and a tax are either too permissive or too
restrictive under the same conditions. For example, if both c0(.),a n dμd0(.)
are linear (as in the ﬁgure) and the median is above the average, then both
a tax and a quota are too permissive.
Suppose that the two marginal costs functions are not symmetric, and
that the marginal cost of paying taxes grows at a faster rate. This is shown
in the lower graph of Figure 1. High types’ marginal costs grow more than
lower types’, pushing the average up. In this case a tax concentrates costs on
high types, a mechanism that is similar to a rule. A majority of low types has
more incentives to raise taxes opportunistically. The ratio between median’s
marginal cost and the average gets lower. Thus a tax is more likely to be
too restrictive than a quota, and it is more similar to a rule. Vice versa, if
the cost of paying taxes is less convex than the cost of adjusting behavior it
happens the contrary: a risk of a too restrictive tax is smaller with respect
to a quota.
Summing up, a majority is more likely to choose a too restrictive tax
than a too restrictive quota when the cost of paying taxes grows faster
than the sacriﬁce of reducing behavior. As for the rule, the majority’s
decision is always more likely to be too restrictive compared to the other
two instruments.
I nA p p e n d i x8 . 2w es h o wt h a tw h e nt a xp r o c e e d sa r eu s e dt om a k e
transfers instead of providing a public good, the political distortion in the
tax rate is lower since the majority chooses a level that is closer to the
socially optimal one.
13h b 0 1 l b h t l t
() l l t b c − '
() i b d , ' μ μ⋅ () h h t b c − '
h b 0 1 l b h t l t
() l l t b c − '
() i b d , ' μ μ ⋅
() h h t b c − '
Figure 1: Adjustments and marginal cost equalization
6 The choice of the policy instrument
6.1 Preliminaries: Revenue equivalents
Consider the issue of voting on the policy instrument: now the majority
determines not only the level of the policy but also which instrument to
adopt. The policy issue becomes two-dimensional thus we have to take care
of the existence of a Condorcet winner. Our main result in this Section is
that under simple conditions the majority prefers a rule to a tax even though
a social planner would choose a tax. This is more likely to happen when the
median voter is a relatively low polluter. In this situation the risk of a too
restrictive rule is quite high.
The beneﬁts and costs of rules or quotas derive from “behaviors”, whereas
beneﬁts and costs of externality taxes derive also from “tax revenues”.
Therefore, in order to compare beneﬁts and costs we introduce the con-
cept of revenue equivalent deﬁned as the total amount of virtuous behavior
or tax proceeds that it generates. As it will become clear later, we use
this concept to represent within the same policy space the choice among
the three diﬀerent instruments. Behavior and proceeds are measured in the
same unit. For example, reducing the behavior of a hundred people by 0.2
is revenue equivalent to collecting 20 units of taxes. Note that this is not
14restrictive since the beneﬁts of taxes and polluting behavior are then evalu-
ated by means of generically diﬀerent utility and cost functions. Call RE(.)










0 [t − (1 − μ) · b(μ,t)]dF(t)
As for RE(ρ),n o t et h a t
R 1
ρ tdF(t) is the total pre-rule behavior of the
aﬀected people, and ρ(1 − F(ρ)) is their post-rule behavior. Thus the dif-
ference is the total amount of behavioral reduction (i.e., virtuous behavior)
induced by the rule. In the second equation,
R 1
0 tdF(t) is the total pollut-
ing behavior in the society. The reduction due to the quota is τ
R 1
0 tdF(t).
In the third equation, the revenue equivalent is due to total behavioral re-
ductions (
R 1
0 [t − b(μ,t)]dF(t)) and total tax revenues on residual behaviors
(
R 1
0 μ · b(μ,t)dF(t)). Summing and rearranging yields the left-hand side.
Below we study beneﬁts and costs of the three instruments, as a function
of the same measure, RE. After, we look for the Condorcet winner, then
we discuss eﬃciency. In Appendix 8.2 we analyze the simpler case in which
tax revenues are redistributed lump sum and there is no public good. The
results are similar, but we characterize the conditions that make the tax
more attractive. A conceptually easy but analytically cumbersome extension
would allow us to consider both public goods and transfers.
6.2 Private beneﬁts from RE
A rule performs better when ε is rather concave: the main objective is
restricting the behavior of top polluters, then a rule is the best way to do it.
However beneﬁts from a tax may be large because of the double dividend.18
Call BE(ρ) and BE(μ) the private beneﬁt functions of a rule and a quota
respectively. Figure 2 shows reasonable shapes for them: initially the rule
performs better because the top polluters are aﬀected; for large RE amounts
t h ed o u b l ed i v i d e n de ﬀect becomes more relevant.19
6.3 Private costs from RE
1. Let us start with a rule. How much does a given amount of RE costs
individual i when the instrument is a rule? As long as ρ ≥ ti,t h e r ea r en o
18It is worth reemphasizing here that we are restricting our attention to proportional
tax. Larger beneﬁts for a majority of low types could be achieved with a progressive tax
on polluting activities which would approximate a rule, but as discussed above existence
of a Condorcet winner is unclear with generalized that schedules.
19We omit to represent BE(τ) in the graph since we show below that a quota is never






Figure 2: Beneﬁts from rules and taxes
private costs. In other words, any i enjoys a “zero-cost area” up to RE(ρ =
ti). Above that level, i has to reduce his behavior bearing a compliance cost.
For a low type a rule is a cheap way to generate large amounts of RE:t h e
zero-cost area is extended and the cost of additional RE is shared among
many individuals. In fact, marginal costs are inversely proportional to the
aﬀected population.20 Vice versa a rule can be quite costly for a high type.
Denote with CE(ρ,ti) t h ec o s tf u n c t i o no ft y p ei. Figure 3 shows a possible
shape when ti is in an intermediate position.
2. Call CE(τ,ti) t h ec o s to fRE when the instrument is a quota. There
are no zero-cost areas in this case. The cost is shared more equally over the
population, thus high types make smaller private sacriﬁces with respect to
the rule, at least for suﬃciently large amounts of RE. Low types pay more
for a quota than for a rule due to the extended zero-cost area. Since revenue
equivalents come from proportional adjustments, marginal cost of RE are
proportional to types.21 A possible shape is in Figure 3. When ti increases
the curve shifts upwards proportionally.
3. Let CE(μ,ti) be the cost of RE generated by a tax. Since individuals






















The marginal cost of RE is rather high when the aﬀected population is low.
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Figure 3: Costs from rules, quotas and taxes
minimize costs by balancing behavior and tax, for any RE and any type the
private cost of a tax is always lower (and ﬂatter) than the cost of a quota.
Ap o s s i b l eCE(μ,ti) is in Figure 3. How is CE(μ,ti) related to ti?L e t
us assume that the sacriﬁce of paying a tax is comparable to the cost of









Any marginal increase in RE costs individual i an amount that is proportional to the
r a t i ob e t w e e nh i st y p ea n dt h ea v e r a g et y p e .
17marginal costs are proportional to types.22
We can now look at the choice of the policy instrument. Consider that a
quota is always more costly than a tax and, due to the double dividend, it is
also less beneﬁcial. Thus a quota is never preferred to a tax. The instrument
choice can be restricted to a binary comparison between a rule and a tax.
6.4 Existence of a Condorcet winner: simultaneous voting
Let us begin with the case in which voting takes place simultaneously on an
issue that has two dimensions. The ﬁrst is discrete and binary: either a tax
or a rule. The second one, which is continuous, is the level of the instrument.
Choosing the level implies choosing the amount of RE. Thus we will refer
to the second dimension as the choice of RE. We can ensure the existence
of a Condorcet winner if the equilibrium is a median “in both dimensions”
(Davis, DeGroot and Hinich, 1972; Banks, Duggan and Le Breton, 2006).
Observe that, as regards RE, preferences are single peaked and the median
bliss points belong to the median type both in the case of a tax and in the
case of a rule.
Thus an equilibrium exists as far as all individuals either above or below
the median voter prefer, for any RE, the same instrument preferred by the
median. For example, if the median prefers a rule because it is the best
instrument to generate RE and all lower types prefer a rule too, the median
22In fact, RE(μ)=¯ t − (1 − μ) · ¯ b(μ),w h e r e¯ t is the average of F(t),a n d¯ b(μ) is the
average after-tax behavior. We can write
∂RE
∂μ
= ¯ b − (1 − μ) ·
∂¯ b(μ)
∂μ
Consider individual i. If paying taxes and changing behavior has the same impact on costs
(i.e., c(.)=d(.)), then we can write:

























bi − (1 − μ) · b
0
i
¯ b − (1 − μ) ·¯ b
0 · c
0(.)
We can reasonably assume that the ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of this equation is
constant, and proportional to
ti
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18instrument is a rule and the median level is ρ∗
s. Thus the Condorcet winner
is RE(ρ∗
s).23
While it is true that low types are inclined towards rules and high types
towards taxes, we do not necessarily expect that all voters under a given
type prefer a rule and all those above it prefer the tax. Nonetheless, we can
give a suﬃcient condition for it. The idea is simple: take the median type ts.
Assume that he prefers a rule; i.e., BE(ρ∗
s,t s) − CE(ρ∗
s,t s) >B E (μ∗
s,t s) −
CE(μ∗
s,t s). Consider lower types. They prefer more RE, thus they compare
additional (i.e. marginal) beneﬁts and costs for both instruments. Assume
that the marginal beneﬁts of the two instruments are the same.24 Thus the
choice is based on marginal costs of RE. We want that for all types under
the median a rule is the cheapest way to generate more RE.25 As u ﬃcient
condition is that for any lower type the marginal cost of a rule decreases
more than the marginal cost of a tax. Consider that if the marginal cost of
a rule is large then it is “more sensitive” to type decrease. Thus the idea
is that if the median prefers a rule and his marginal cost is relatively large,
lower types have stronger incentives to prefer a rule since in this case their
costs decrease by a larger amount.
Our suﬃcient condition for monotonicity in both dimensions is: ﬁrst,
the median prefers a rule and the marginal cost of a rule is suﬃciently large;
second, this requisite on costs applies to all types below the median. Lemma
below takes care of both parts of this condition.
Lemma 4 a) If the median prefers a rule to a tax, if marginal beneﬁts of






then a marginally lower type prefers a rule to a tax.





then all types below the median prefer a rule to a tax.
Inequality (17) may be explained with an example. Suppose that (1 −
F(ρ∗
s)) = 0.5 and ¯ t/ts =1 . Recall that for the median the marginal cost
of a rule is proportional to 1/(1 − F(ρ∗
s)) = 2, and the marginal cost of a
tax is proportional to ts/¯ t =1 . Thus a marginal decrease in ts will cause a
23We focus on this kind of equilibrium. The reader can easily infer the conditions such
that the alternative equilibrium is RE(μ
∗
s).
24The assumption of comparable marginal beneﬁts is not unrealistic because, due to the
concavity of ε,s u b s t a n t i a ld i ﬀerences in marginal beneﬁts occur only for small RE.
25The reader may observe that a similar argument supports Grandmont’s (1978) suﬃ-
cient condition for the existence of a Condorcet winner in multidimesional policy problems.
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Figure 4: Monotonic preferences in both dimensions
reduction in marginal cost that is double in the case of a rule than in the
case of a tax. Since marginal beneﬁts for a rule and a tax are the same,
then an individual that is marginally lower than the median chooses the
rule. Observe that (17) introduces a “local” requisite that concerns only a
marginal decrease in ts. Part b) of Lemma 4 extends the requisite to all
types below ts.
The voting stage is in Figure 4. The x-axis is the second dimension of the
policy space, the set of RE.26 The ﬁrst dimension is binary. Thus we have
two kinds of policy preferences: the dashed curves are the preferences in case
of a tax; the solid curves represent the rule preferences. The median’s curves
are bold. Lower types prefer more RE both under a rule and under a tax;
i.e., bliss points are (inversely) monotonic in RE and the median bliss points
belong to the median type in both cases. Under Lemma 4, the median prefers
a rule. Moreover, for all types below him, a rule is the preferred instrument
to generate additional RE: the rule preference functions are higher. It is
easy to see that in this case the Condorcet winner is RE(ρ∗
s).
What makes this equilibrium more likely to occur? Recall that a rule
can be rather costly when the median is relatively high. Thus a rule is likely
to emerge in equilibrium when the median is low. Moreover, if the double
dividend is low and externalities are highly concave, the beneﬁts of a rule
compensate the costs. Thus a rule is likely when the externality problem is
somehow more relevant than the provision of a public good, and the main
concern is curbing top polluters’ behaviors.
Proposition 5 If the median is relatively low, the double dividend is low
26Recall that people do not vote on RE, directly. However, by choosing the level of an
instrument, they uivocally vote on RE.
20and high behaviors produce large negative externalities, and conditions in
Lemma 4 apply, then the majority prefers a rule and selects the median’s
most preferred one.
Interestingly, when the median is below the average and he prefers a
rule, the Condorcet winner is “almost sure”, in the sense that we have only
to ensure that the second part of Lemma 4 applies.
Corollary 1 If the median is below the average and Lemma 4-b) applies,
then the majority always prefers a rule.
Vice versa, when the median is in a relatively high position, the double
dividend is important and consistent pollution is due also to the behavior
of low types, then a tax is more likely to prevail.
Which is the composition of a majority that prefers a rule? Arguably
there are extremely low types. Their instrument choice is determined only
by costs concerns: with a rule they can induce at zero or very low cost
virtuous behavior by others. There might also be intermediate types, who
are available to pay a possibly large private cost because they look at the
rule as a more eﬃcient way to cope with the externality problem.
6.5 Existence of a Condorcet winner: sequential voting
We now assume that voting takes place sequentially: ﬁrst, the majority
selects the instrument; then it chooses its level. In this case, a Condorcet
winner always exists.27 Individuals know that, whatever the instrument, the
level that will pass at the second stage is the one preferred by the median,
either ρ∗
s or μ∗
s. The revenue equivalent outcome is either RE(ρ∗
s) or RE(μ∗
s).
All individuals compare their indirect utilities in those two cases, and choose
which instrument to vote for. Since the choice at the ﬁrst stage is binary,
there will always be a majority that prefers either one of the instruments.
No scope for strategic vote. This majority behaves as a Stackelberg leader:
it selects the instrument and it lets another majority choose the level. In-
terestingly, the two majorities are possibly diﬀerent since we do not impose
any monotonicity condition at the ﬁrst stage. The median’s most preferred
level always passes, but not always his most preferred instrument. This is
the main diﬀerence with simultaneous voting.
What makes RE(ρ∗
s) more ore less likely than RE(μ∗
s)? The general idea
is the same as for the simultaneous case: low types tend to prefer the rule
and high types prefer the tax. Thus, a rule is more likely to pass when the
distribution is slanted towards high types, externalities are quite concave
and the double dividend is low.
27Usually, the equilibrium is sensitive to the voting sequence (De Donder, Le Breton
and Peluso, 2010). In this case we do not have such a problem since the inverse sequence
in which the instrument is decided after its level is unnatural.
216.6 Normative aspects
Consider now the policy benchmark. A proportional tax is socially prefer-
able, except when externalities are very concave and the double dividend is
low. In fact, a rule is always “socially” more costly than a tax. The ﬁrst
reason is cost convexity: a rule concentrates the burden of RE on higher
types, who also have higher costs. The second reason is cost minimization:
a tax allows individuals to choose if paying the tax or reducing behavior.
As for beneﬁts, a tax is not always the best instrument. It has the advan-
tage of the double dividend, whereas a rule produces larger beneﬁts when
externalities are highly concave, since it aﬀects top polluters. Thus, only
in the case of quite concave externalities and rather low double dividend
the social planner prefers a (socially costly) rule. In that case, however,
the optimal rule would not be very restrictive, since its main task would be
reducing the behavior of high types to moderate levels. In all other cases a
proportional tax performs better: larger beneﬁts from the double dividend
and lower social costs. It is worth repeating that without any restrictions
on the shape of the tax schedule a tax would always be superior to other
policy instruments.
H o wi st h i sn o r m a t i v ec o n c l u s i o nr e l a ted to the positive results above?
A general idea is that the if the majority chooses a rule when the social
planner would choose a tax, then a too restrictive rule is very likely. In fact,
suppose that the socially optimal instrument is a tax. If the distribution is
slanted towards high types, there will be suﬃcient support for selecting a
rule and, under the same conditions, the rule is rather restrictive. Vice versa,
if the socially optimal instrument is a rule, the majority selects the wrong
instrument (a tax) only when the median is in a relatively high position. In
this case, the tax level chosen by the majority is too low.
In Appendix 8.2 we show that this kind of distortions might be lower
when tax revenues are redistributed lump sum.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We have examined the political economy of how to curb activities which
generate negative externalities. We showed two things. First for given pol-
icy tool (rules, quota or taxes) the median voter almost never chooses the
eﬃcient level of the policy instrument. Both too lenient or too harsh poli-
cies against the activity with negative externalities are possible in a voting
equilibrium, and we characterized under which circumstances one outcome
or the other occurs. Too stringent restrictions (or taxes) occur when the ac-
tivity with negative externality is concentrated on a relatively small fraction
of the population and when negative externalities grow more than propor-
tionally with the level of the polluting activity. In the opposite case instead
regulation or taxation would be too lenient. Second we showed that when
22the majority can also choose the policy instrument it would not necessarily
c h o o s et h em o s te ﬃcient one. For instance, taxing the activity with negative
externality is in general superior to rules or quotas, but the majority may
prefer a rule in order to charge the minority a larger share of the adjustment
burden.
One could explore several extensions. First, some activities with negative
externalities (but not all) impose cost on future generations who do not vote,
at least not directly except for the intergenerational altruism of parents
toward their children. One could discuss how these considerations would
inﬂuence the median voter.
Second, one could try to extend the analysis to more sophisticated tax
schedules allowing for some curvature in the tax rate. Our hunch is that
when the population is concentrated on low types the majority would choose
a more “progressive” tax than the social planner. In a sense even the out-
come of a rule can be obtained by a zero tax rate up to the limit of the
rule and a prohibitive tax rate above it. But presumably given the double
dividend the majority could do even better perhaps by allowing a little bit
of pollution but extracting a lot of tax revenues from the high types. Once
again the solution of this problem is complex because the voting would take
place on a multidimensional space including level and curvature of the tax
rate.
Third, thus far we have imposed that rules and quotas are followed by
all. This equilibrium is equivalent to assuming perfect monitoring (or im-
perfect monitoring with such a high ﬁne if caught that nobody cheats in
equilibrium). In reality, rules can be broken. In general the social choice
involves a certain amount of investment in costly monitoring activities and
the selection of a ﬁne. The revenue from the ﬁne could be used to ﬁnance
monitoring and, if anything is left over, to provide public goods. With im-
perfect monitoring and a ﬁne, individual polluters would choose how much
to pollute and how much risk of being caught is worth taking. This would
lead to a less sharp distinction between a rule (or a quota) and a tax. This
distinction would become even less stark if tax avoidance or evasion is also
allowed. An interesting result which would most likely hold is that for cer-
tain parameter values the median voter would not choose prohibitive ﬁnes
for polluting activities if one considers the revenues obtained from collect-
ing ﬁnes. This extension would imply adding several parameter values: the
monitoring technology, risk aversion, expenditure of ﬁne proceeds.
The fourth extension relates to voting rules. In our model any possible
form of tyranny does not come from direct expropriation of the minority but
rather from the fact that, within the political process, the majority ignores
the costs incurred by the minority. This may result in decisions that are too
costly from a social viewpoint. If for example the median’s policy were too
restrictive, eﬃciency would be enhanced by giving the minority of high types
some amount of blocking power. This is frequently done by adopting super-
23majorities.28 The problem is that a super-majority assigns blocking power
not only to high types, but also to low types. In our model with single-peaked
policy preferences even policies that are more restrictive and ineﬃcient than
the median’s one may emerge in equilibrium (Black, 1948b). If the objective
is avoiding that the median is the pivot, a super-majority does not make
the job. A potential alternative is giving the minority more voting weight.29
The idea is simple: when the median’s policy is too restrictive we must
“shift the pivot” towards a higher type, whose bliss point is at the socially
eﬃcient level. This can be done by keeping simple majority and assigning
types above the desired pivot a mass of votes equal to the votes held by
those who are below the pivot.30 In this case the equilibrium is unique and
it is socially eﬃcient. The issue here is not equity: assigning more power to
the most concerned individuals in order to counter balance the power of the
least concerned ones improves eﬃciency. Implementation problems of such
schemes are however extremely severe.
28Literature on super-majorities is vast and belongs to the normative analysis of consti-
tutions. The focus is mainly on distributional issues (see Mueller (2003) for an extensive
survey). Aghion and Bolton (2003) suggest that, when preferences are not single-peaked,
higher super-majorities lower the risk of Condorcet cycles, but also lower the chance of
circumventing ex-post vested interests; the solution of this trade-oﬀ yields the optimal
majority threshold. Dixit, Grossman and Gul (2000) argue that super-majority rules may
reduce compromise; as a consequence, the incidence of majority tyranny may increase.
Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) analyze the constitutional choice about the level of
supermajority needed to block policies of elected political leaders.
29The literature on weighted voting is possibly less developed, and mostly concerned
with problems of equal representation in indirect democracies. Barbera and Jackson (2006)
suggest a mixture of weights and super-majority that allows sticking with the status quo,
unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast for change.
30Consider the case of a too restrictive rule. If the optimal level is ρ
∗ we must assign each
individual whose bliss point is equal or larger than ρ
∗ additional weight, by multiplying





For example, if the optimal rule corresponds to the individual in the third quartile
position (F(ρ
∗)=.75)w em u s tg i v ee a c hh i g h e rt y p et h r e ev o t e si n s t e a do fo n e .
248A p p e n d i x
8.1 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Lemma 1 For any two individuals i and j,i f ti >t j then ρ∗
i ≥ ρ∗
j.






ε00(ρ)(1− F(ρ)) − ε0(ρ)f(ρ) − c00(|ρ − ti|)
(18)
The denominator in the right-hand of (18) is the second derivative of Ui(ρ),
which is negative by assumption. Thus, for any ρ∗




is positive, since c00(|ρ − ti|) > 0. The relationship between type and bliss
point is weakly monotone in order to account for corner bliss points (i.e.,
ρ∗
i = ρ∗
j =0 ,f o rs o m eti >t j).
Proposition 1 i) Simple majority voting yields a too restrictive (too
permissive) rule if and only if in equilibrium the ratio between the median
voter’s marginal cost and the average marginal cost of the aﬀected population
is lower (higher) than the share of the aﬀected population.
ii) Majority voting yields the socially optimal rule if and only if the ratio
between those marginal costs equals the share of the aﬀected population.
Proof. Let us prove part i) of the Proposition. Consider the case of
a too restrictive rule. Recall that ˆ ρ∗ solves (7), and that the ac0(ρ) curve
crosses the ε0(ρ) curve ’from below’. Since ˆ ρs < ˆ ρ∗,w eh a v e
(1 − F(ˆ ρs)) · ε0(ˆ ρs) >a c 0(ˆ ρs)
and
(1 − F(ˆ ρs)) · ε0(ˆ ρs)=c0(|ˆ ρs − ts|)
Therefore,
c0(|ˆ ρs − ts|) >a c 0(ˆ ρs)
or, since ac0(ˆ ρs) is negative,
c0(|ˆ ρs − ts|)
ac0(ˆ ρs)/(1 − F(ˆ ρs))
< 1 − F(ˆ ρs)
where ac0(ˆ ρs)/(1 − F(ˆ ρs)) is the average marginal cost computed over the
aﬀected population.
Equivalently, the condition for a too permissive rule emerging is the follow-
ing:
c0(ˆ ρs − ts)
ac0(ˆ ρs)/(1 − F(ˆ ρs))
> 1 − F(ˆ ρs)
The proof of the part ii) of the Proposition is straightforward.
25Lemma 2 For any two individuals i and j,i f ti >t j then τ∗
i ≤ τ∗
j.
Proof. The proof parallels the proof of Lemma 1. By implicit diﬀeren-










The denominator in the right hand of (19) is the SOC, which is negative by
assumption. The ﬁrst term at the numerator is the impact of an increase in
ti on the marginal adjustment cost, which is negative; the second one is neg-
ative, by convexity of the cost function. Thus,
∂τ∗
i
∂yi is negative. Monotonicity
is weak because of corner bliss points.
Proposition 2 Simple majority voting yields a too restrictive (too per-
missive) quota if and only if in equilibrium the median voter’s marginal cost
is lower (higher) than the average marginal cost.
Proof. Let us consider the case of a too restrictive quota, ˆ τs > ˆ τ∗.F r o m
(9) and from (10), we have:







T h ev i c ev e r s ah o l d sf o rat o ol o wq u o t a .
Proposition 3 When the majority selects a rule that is too permissive,
then it selects a quota that is also too permissive. The vice versa is not true.
Proof. If an interior rule is too permissive then
c0(|ˆ ρs − ts|)
ac0(ˆ ρs)
> 1
We want to show that, for any τ,
tsc0(τts)/ac0(τ) > 1
Consider that ac0(ˆ ρs) is an average in which the only non-zero elements
are the (1−F(ˆ ρs)) marginal costs of the aﬀected people above F(ˆ ρs);w h e r e
1−F(ˆ ρs) > 0.5.M o r e o v e r50% of these elements are larger than c0(|ˆ ρs − ts|).
Further consider that when a quota is adopted, marginal costs are more
evenly distributed across the population. This means that, for any τ, 50%
elements above the average and above the median’s marginal cost enter
26ac0(τ) w i t hl o w e rv a l u e s ,w h i c hc o n t i n u et ob ea b o v et h em e d i a n ’ sm a r g i n a l
cost; moreover F(ˆ ρs) elements enter ac0(τ) with a non-zero value that is in
any case below the median’s marginal cost. Thus, it might be the case that
ac0(τ) >a c 0(ˆ ρs), but ac0(τ) cannot be larger that the median’s marginal
cost, tsc0(τts).
Lemma 3 For any two individuals i and j,i f ti >t j then μ∗
i ≤ μ∗
j.
Proof. For any tax rate, individuals set their behavior in order to satisfy
condition (11). It is easy to see that, if ti increases, this condition is satisﬁed
for higher marginal costs. Moreover, for any ti,i fμ increases, then condition
(11) is satisﬁed for higher marginal costs. Thus, total costs are convex in
μ, and, for any μ, marginal costs are higher for higher types. Observe
that beneﬁts, i.e. the ﬁrst two terms in the right-hand side of (13), are
independent of the type. Moreover, the concavity of (13) in μ implies that
the marginal cost curve crosses the marginal beneﬁt curve from below. Thus,
as type increases, the crossing point, i.e. the optimal level of μ, decreases.
Lemma 4 a) If the median prefers a rule to a tax, if marginal beneﬁts






then a marginally lower type prefers a rule to a tax.





then all types below the median prefer a rule to a tax.
Proof. Consider part a) of the Lemma. Individual s’s optimal choice of







Call RE(ρ∗) the revenue equivalent when the optimal rule is applied. Let
μ0 the tax level that yields the same revenue equivalent, and call RE(μ0)













bi − (1 − μ0) · b0
i
¤
· c0(.), as in Section 6. A marginal
decrease in ts results in the marginal changes (namely, marginal decreases)
27of c0(ti − ρ) and ω0(.). We can reasonably assume that their amounts are






i.e., if condition (20) is satisﬁed, then a lower type "saves" in marginal costs
more if he chooses a rule than if he chooses a tax. Thus it cannot be that a
ts prefers a rule and a marginally lower type prefers a tax. Part b) can be
proved applying the proof of part a) recursively.
Proposition 5 If the median is relatively low, the double dividend is
low and high behaviors produce large negative externalities, and conditions
in Lemma 4 apply, then the majority prefers a rule and selects the median’s
most preferred one.
Proof. The median prefers a rule when his position is low, externalities
are quite concave and the double dividend is small. Conditions in Lemma 4
are suﬃcient to ensure that the median bliss points in both voting dimensions
belong to the median type. Thus the Condorcet winner is RE(ρ∗
s).
Corollary 1 If the median is below the average and Lemma 4-b) applies,
then the majority always prefers a rule.
Proof. Observe that if the median is below the average, then
¯ t
ts > 1.
Thus condition (20) is always satisﬁed. We only need that part b) of Lemma
4 applies.
288.2 Transfers rather than public goods
We assume here that the tax proceeds are redistributed with lump sum
transfers to individuals and no public good is provided. We show that
making ﬁxed transfers instead of providing a public good does not change
qualitatively the nature of our results.
Each individual receives out of a balanced public budget a transfer which





with ω(.,μ,ti)=c(|bi − ti|)+d(μ(bi−¯ b)). Individual optimization leads to:
−c0(|bi − ti|)=μ · d0(μ(bi −¯ b)) (21)
Transfers reduce the marginal cost of paying taxes (i.e., d0(μ(bi − ¯ b) <
d0(μbi)). This eﬀect on costs replaces the “double dividend” of Section
5. Thus, on the one hand, private marginal beneﬁts are lower since no
public good is supplied but, on the other hand, marginal costs are smaller.
While the former eﬀect is the same for all individuals, the latter is stronger
for higher types, due to cost convexity. Below we show that this plays an
important role on the eﬃciency of the voting outcome.
Bliss points are monotonically related to types and the voting outcome
is the tax rate preferred by the median. The benchmark would be a tax rate
such that the per capita marginal beneﬁt is equal to the per capita (average)
marginal costs. Similarly to the other instruments, a possible ineﬃciency
is due to a discrepancy between the median and the average marginal cost:
high cost convexity and rightward slanted distributions favor too high tax
rates. Observe however that transfers “smooth down” diﬀerences among
individual marginal costs. This means that, with respect to the case with
public good, the median’s marginal cost is closer to the average. The median
chooses a tax rate that is closer to the one that would be chosen by the social
planner: the possible ineﬃciency is smaller. As for the risk of too restrictive
or too permissive outcomes, a result in Section 5 applies: if d is more convex
than c then the tax with transfers is more likely to be too restrictive with
respect to a quota, and it is more similar to a rule. Consider now beneﬁts
and costs as a function of RE. Due to the absence of the double dividend
beneﬁts are lower with transfers than with a public good, but also costs are
lower since individuals pay a smaller net amount of money for any level of
RE. Thus, if the utility from the public good is low or if the sacriﬁce of
paying taxes is large, a tax with transfers is more attractive than a tax with
a public good.
Let us look at the instrument choice. A tax with transfers is superior to
a quota since for any amount of RE individuals optimize costs by choosing
behavioral reductions and tax payments on residual behaviors. Thus the
29choice is between the tax and the rule. Our analysis in Section 6 does
not change substantially: if the instrument/level choice is simultaneous the
condition for a Condorcet winner is rather simple; if the choice is sequential a
winner always exists. Let’s consider the simultaneous choice. The marginal
eﬀect of tax increase on RE i st h es a m ea sf o rt h ec a s ew i t hp u b l i cg o o d :
∂RE
∂μ
= ¯ b − (1 − μ) ·¯ b0
where ¯ b is the after-tax average behavior and ¯ b0 =
∂¯ b(μ)
∂μ .T h em a r g i n a lc o s t
is lower. As in Section 6 assume that the sacriﬁce of changing behavior





bi −¯ b − (1 − μ) · b0
i − μ¯ b0¤
· c0(.)




bi −¯ b − (1 − μ) · b0
i − μ¯ b0
¯ b − (1 − μ) ·¯ b
0 · c0(.)
If we assume that the ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of this equation is
proportional to ti/¯ t, then marginal costs are proportional to types. Thus
Lemma 4 applies. Accordingly, condition 1 − F(ρ∗
i) < ¯ t/ti (for any ti ≤ ts)
is suﬃcient to ensure that the rule is the majority’s choice. Observe however
that this condition is even too stringent when the marginal beneﬁts of a rule
are larger than the marginal beneﬁts of a tax. This is the case when no public
good is provided. This implies that a stable majority on the rule is easy to
form. In synthesis, with transfers it is less likely that a median prefers a
rule, but once this happens the chance that a stable majority forms on a
rule is higher. As for the sequential case, the argument of Section 6.5 holds.
Since the choice is binary, there will always be a majority that behaves as
a Stackelberg leader: it chooses either a tax with transfers or a rule, based
on the level that will be voted at the second stage.
Summing up, a ﬁrst result is that with transfers the majority chooses
al e s si n e ﬃcient tax level because median and average marginal costs are
closer. A second result is that with transfers the majority is more inclined
towards a tax, then it is more likely to prefer the “right” instrument. How-
ever, a very low median prefers the rule in any case. In this case a stable
majority on the rule is easier to form and the level is quite high (a too re-
strictive rule). On the contrary, a high median prefers a tax with transfers
but, if the optimal instrument is the rule, ineﬃciency is lower with respect
to the case with public good.
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